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Abstract
Relying on the Nigeria Watch database and newspaper 
reports from August 2014 to April 2018, this study 
analyses the root causes, patterns, and politicisation of 
the farmers/herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria. This study 
critically examines the relationship between climate 
change, land disputes, and the patterns of farmers/ 
herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria. 
Scholars’ attempts to examine the relationship between 
environmental (in)sustainability and violent conflicts 
have been largely inconclusive. The recent conflicts 
between farmers and herdsmen may have taken a different 
pattern, especially in the North-Central region of Nigeria. 
Many people have attributed the increase in the conflicts 
between the two communities (farmers and herdsmen) 
to several non-environmental factors. The study adopts 
longitudinal research methods to unearth the connections 
between climate change, land disputes, and the patterns 
of the conflicts. It, however, looks at the conflict(s) as a 
product of environmental influences but escalated by the 
“vested interests” benefiting from the continued conflicts 
in the region.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper looks at the uneasy relations between farmers 
(or crop producers) and herdsmen (livestock keepers) 
in Nigeria. This relationship has become the subject of 
academic interests in recent time due to its implications 
for food security, development, national security, and the 
environment in the era of climate change. This relationship 
is ‘uneasy’ because some see it essentially as characterised 
as violent and conflictual with no benefit whatsoever for 
either party, while others see it as symbiotic where both 
parties benefit despite the tensions over limited resources 
both lay claim(s) to. Also, some scholars see the tensed 
relations as caused essentially as human competitive 
tendencies for limited space or resources. Only recently 
has there been media outrage over the bloodlettings 
resulting from violent conflicts between the two groups 
in Nigeria’s North-Central region. The frequencies of 
these conflicts since 2014 in the North-Central part of 
Nigeria makes the issue a source of developmental, 
environmental, national security, and inter-ethnic political 
concerns (Adams and Bradbury, 1995).
Although it is a problem that dates back to the pre-
colonial period, the frequency of farmers/herdsmen 
conflicts appears to be on the increase in recent times. There 
also seem to be no clear consensus among scholars to show 
a clear time-series evidence and the factor(s) responsible 
for this rise in violent conflicts between the farmers and the 
herdsmen (Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon, 1999; Olayoku, 
2016). Recently, several claims have been made as to the 
factors that have given rise to the seeming rising incidence 
of violent attacks between the herders and the farmers in 
Nigeria with serious national security implications. The 
solutions proffered have been between two irreconcilable 
extremes which include politicians urging violent reactions 
on the sight of one community member of the other. 
The causes of the changing violent conflicts between 
the two communities in literature have been attributed 
to the following: (i) the breakdown of ‘traditional’ 
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management of resource (land) and conflict resolution 
between both parties since the interventions of the post-
colonial state in Africa (ii) changing patterns of land 
reforms and increased competitive demand for land for 
various use(s) between the “landedness” (owners of land, in 
this case, the farmers) and the “landless” (those who do not 
own land, in this case, the herdsmen) (Dafinger and Pelican, 
2006) (iii) increase in the population of livestock, humans, 
urbanisation, and other causative agents in the demand for 
land for several uses and the declining weather conditions 
causing draughts and food supplies (Bassett, 1986) (iv) 
the role of vested interests, “invisible hands” or “third 
force” profiting from the continued conflicts. The fourth 
point is rarely looked at by scholars in the understanding 
of the changing patterns of the conflicts between both 
communities. These arguments have, however, been used 
to advance and advocate development policy changes 
in other to mitigate the conflicts. Some of these policy 
changes include the establishment of “cattle colonies” or 
reserves; or the drawing of lines or land sharing (Dafinger 
and Pelican, 2006) between herders and farmers which will 
include comprehensive reforms in land tenure systems. 
Some other recommendations have included that since the 
state has played partisan roles by taking sides with one 
faction against the other, the state should withdraw and both 
parties should revert to the traditional means of conflict 
resolutions dating back to the pre-colonial era with the state 
“strengthening of local structures for conflict settlement 
and prevention with the participation of traditional leaders, 
representatives of the local administration” (Cabot, 
2017, p.162; Bello, 2013). Despite the fact that all these 
explanations have their obvious gaps, the assumptions and 
theses upon which they are based are very robust.
This paper, therefore, looks at the new patterns of 
violent conflicts, exploring their causes, patterns and 
consequences based on the following research questions:
• What is the connection between climate change and 
the patterns of the Farmer/Herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria?
• What is the connection between land disputes and the 
conflicts?
• How have the key actors in the conflicts responded to 
the conflicts?
These questions will be analysed using content analysis 
as a research method. This paper hopes to fill a research 
gap, especially in the role of vested interests, “invisible 
hands” or “third force” in the conflicts, that seems to 
have escaped rigorous academic inquiry because there is 
a current tendency for scholars to overlook or empirically 
under-researched this aspect of farmer/herdsmen relations. 
FARMERS/HERDSMEN RELATIONS, SOCIAL 
ORGANISATION, AND CONFLICTS: A 
THEORETICAL EXPLORATION
The literature on farmers/herdsmen relations reveals three 
perspectives as a level in the social organisation. The first 
perspective notes that the Farmers/Herdsmen relations 
have always been based on cooperation or symbiosis. 
As Bassett (1986, p.248) contends in his study of Fulani 
nomads in West Africa, that the relationship between both 
parties “reflects this human ecological symbiosis between 
pastoralists and farmers.” This is because scholars have 
had challenges separating between the planting of crop 
and livestock production as two distinct entities. As 
noted by Toulmin (1983) and Pelissier (1977), since both 
communities contribute fairly to the balancing of the 
Agricultural ecosystem, many farmers are increasingly 
keeping livestock and herders are increasingly engaging 
in the cultivation of crops in Africa. Though both farmers 
and herdsmen have distinct cultures and sometimes 
compete for limited space, they need each other more 
often than they do not. In this case, both communities, 
know each other well through social interactions and 
maintenance of the social organisation. But, “conflicts 
over crop damage” (Bassett, 1986, p.248) often strain this 
complementary relationship. This perspective argues that 
the relations between both communities are symbiotic. 
The key challenge to this seeming peaceful relation 
between both communities could be traced to the social 
value of land which often defines social relations and 
standings of the individual in a social hierarchy with 
others having to bear the burden of being classified as 
“landless” (Dafinger and Pelican, 2006, p.147).
The second perspective in their relationship is 
overwhelmingly supported by several scholars and policy 
analysts that competition, conflict, and rivalry defines 
the relations. The frequent violent conflicts between both 
parties in Nigeria which have recorded loss of lives have 
placed the farmers/herdsmen conflicts on the front burner 
of political discourse in recent times. Bassett (1986) and 
Bennett (1991) note that limited supply of land coupled 
poor weather conditions and unpredictable environmental 
factors such increase the chances of violent conflicts, stiff 
competition, and rivalry between farmers and herdsmen. 
The conflicts have also been explained in terms of the 
forces of increase in urbanisation, human population, 
and socio-economic factors arising from unemployment 
(Cohen, 2009). Cabot (2017) sees the conflicts as traceable 
to the impacts of climate change. In the extensive study of 
the impacts of climate change on the Farmers/Herdsmen 
conflicts in three West African countries of Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana and Burkina Faso, Cabot (2017, p.4) argues that the 
two “groups that depend heavily on natural resources are 
especially vulnerable and likely to see a surge in conflicts 
and violence”. With the severity of climate changes 
expected in the years to come, Cabot argues, the conflicts 
between the two groups are likely to be on the increase. 
On their part, Breusers, Nederlof, and van Rheenen (1998, 
p.380) argue in their study in Burkina Faso note that “both 
livestock and cropping activities compete for the same 
resources, but this cannot be translated into competition 
on ethnic lines, due to the uniformisation of production 
systems and other existing relations.”
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The third perspective, rarely researched, is the 
influence of vested interests in the conflicts. Aluko (2006a, 
p.93) noted that vested interests are stakes “in some entity 
or in the course of events.” The vested interests, “invisible 
hands” or “third force” in the context of farmers/herdsmen 
conflicts often employ “political propaganda … who 
exploit political capital out of these incidence to win the 
support of the electorate in their constituencies.” (Baidoo, 
2014, p.53). Baidoo (2014, p.65) notes further that 
“political exploitation whereby various interest groups 
seek to gain political capital out of the … situation in 
order to gain the support and popularity of the masses”. 
On his part, Ahmed-Gamgum (2018, p.61) argues that 
the conflict between both communities is “politically 
motivated insecurity … which was used as campaign 
outfit” which has “popped up discussions as from 2016 on 
who should be voted into power and who should not be 
voted into power come 2019.” The state can sometimes 
take sides with the vested interest in the conflicts, for 
political reasons, by taking sides with a faction to the 
displeasure of the other, this leaves the other to develop 
“coping strategies” which includes resorting to self-help 
like violence “in order to access and control the remaining 
natural resources” (Cabot, 2017, p.160).
For the purpose of this paper, we use the terms, 
“conflicts”, “violence”, “attacks” and “killings” as 
synonymous. Hussein, et al (1999, p.401) categorise the 
Farmers/Herdsmen conflicts into inter-personal, state and 
political violence. The interpersonal conflicts exist at the 
level of inter-personal relations in the social organisation 
(Aluko, 2006a, p.92). This exists in the form of physical 
assaults between individual members between the two 
communities (Hussein, et al, 1999). State violence arises 
when the state decides to take sides with a party to the 
conflicts for political purposes (ibid). This can take the 
form of expulsion, withdrawal of certain privileges to 
one party for the benefit(s) of the other in the conflict 
leaving them with little option other than self-defence. 
Political violence, on the other hand, is when both parties 
resort to extreme self-help and in many cases, invasion of 
villages, wanton destruction of lives and properties, mass 
murders and infliction of injuries (ibid). The conflict can 
only get to this level when the vested interests feel they 
can derive maximum benefits from such a situation. Also, 
in analysing the phenomenon of the Farmers/Herdsmen 
conflict, this paper adopts the political ecology approach 
which will be explained in the next section.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND FARMER/
H E R D S M E N  C O N F L I C T S :  A N Y 
CONNECTION(S)?
Climate is perhaps the most important aspect of man’s 
natural environment (Aluko, 2006b). It can, therefore, 
be said that any change in climatic conditions will have 
implications for man’s interactions with other humans 
and the environment. Clement and Shelford (1939) note 
that climatic conditions have the capacity to effects 
behavioural changes in human interactions. But can we 
then argue that these give us enough evidence to support 
the claim that there is a connection between climate 
change and conflicts?
Attempts by scholars to find the connections between 
climate change and the farmers/herdsmen conflicts have 
been largely inconclusive, thereby producing three results: 
denial, affirmations, and correlations.
The acrimony brought about by the climate change 
debates has passed three historical phases since the era of 
contentious debates between climate change affirmation 
and scepticism, if not outright denial (Diethelm and 
McKee 2009; McIntyre and McKitrick 2003); to debates 
on nature versus anthropogenic agency following 
scientific affirmation of climate change (Allison et al. 
2009; Carr, Brash and Anderson, 2010; RealClimate 
2005); and to current debates which focus on the scope 
of impacts, options for adaptation, and impacts reduction. 
The recent debates on the impacts of climate change on 
human security are motivated not only by the strength of 
scientific evidence of changing climatic system which 
has spurred global interest (IPCC, 2007) but also by 
recognition of its alarming social implications either 
potential or actual. Among the diverse implications, 
its potential to precipitate violent conflict draws strong 
impetus from increased incidence of resource-related 
violence already manifesting in many parts of the 
developing world (Dokos, 2008; IPCC, 2007).
Some scholars since the end of the Cold War have 
developed frameworks like “environmental security”, 
“environmental conflicts” and “eco-violence” or eco-
violence theories as attempts to explain how “shrinking 
resource pie” is supposedly fuelling violent civil conflicts 
(de Soysa, 2002, p.1). Homer-Dixon (1999), Cabot (2017), 
Bassett (1986), Bennett (1991), and Cohen (2009) argue 
that environmental scarcity, urbanisation, desertification, 
demographic changes play in spawning violent conflicts. 
Others, however, argued that there is “little or no support 
for ecoviolence theories” (de Soysa, 2002, p.27). Percival 
and Homer-Dixon (1998, p.279) explain that the eco-
violence framework defines “scarcities, the social effects 
arising from these scarcities, and the ensuing movement 
towards violence.” The eco-violence framework has been 
a reference case in studies on the interaction between 
human vulnerability in situations of conflict associated 
with environmental problems such as drought, erosion, 
and population growth that is believed to have significant 
causal links pressure on availability of environmental 
resources, aggravating inequality in distribution and 
access to scare resources, and heightening contestation 
among powerful groups to control a limited resource 
(Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996)
To Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1996), Cabot (2017), 
Bassett (1986), Bennett (1991), and Cohen (2009) the eco-
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violence core postulation is that the depletion occurring 
in the amount or quality of resources reduces the total 
[resources] available, while increases in population divide 
what remains [of such natural resources] into smaller 
portions. These scholars identify population growth and 
resource depletion as two potent factors which converge 
to produce conflict in many parts of the developing world.
The eco-violence framework sees conflict as a product 
of scarcity or the fear of natural resources depletion that 
may occur in at least two primary ways as illustrated 
by its proponents: one, “the environmental effects of 
human activities in a given ecological zone, which is in 
itself a function of the total population of the region and 
the physical activity per capita as defined by the level 
of available physical resources (whether non-renewable 
resources, renewable or ideational such as institutions, 
belief systems, social relations and preferences), and 
(2) the level to which the ecosystem in that region is 
vulnerable (Isiugo and Obioha, 2015).
Contrary to the assumption that grievances, group 
identities, and opportunities for violent collective action are 
causally independent, Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998) 
present a socially intertwined process in which grievances 
play a very significant role in influencing the formation of 
groups and in defining what group membership means.
Percival and Homer-Dixon (1998, pp.279-280) note 
that “the causal relationship between environmental 
scarcities- the scarcity of renewable resources-and 
the outbreak of violent conflict is complex... since 
environmental scarcity emerges within a political, social, 
economic, and ecological context and interacts with many 
of these contextual factors to contribute to violence”, 
hence they note that “the context specific to each case 
determines the precise relationship between environmental 
scarcity and outbreaks of violent conflict” (Ibid, p.280).
The relevance of the eco-violence approach in 
examining the dynamics of resource contestations in 
Nigeria derives from the balance of variables captured in 
the framework. The eco-violence framework as described 
by Gleditsch and Urdal (2002) as far removed from the 
simplifications which characterize some other analysis 
of the environment-conflict discourse as represented by 
the sensationalism of Kaplan (1994). Thus, Homer-Dixon 
avoids the tendency for definitive claims presenting 
population pressure and environmental degradation 
as sole sources of violent environmental conflict and 
instead emphasizes the close interrelationship between 
demographic/environmental, social, and political factors 
in the generation of violent conflict.
POLITICAL ECOLOGY, LAND DISPUTES, 
A N D  T H E  FA R M E R S / H E R D S M E N 
CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
To properly understand the Farmers/Herdsmen conflicts 
in Nigeria, it is important to look at the political contexts 
where both operate. Okoli (2013) and Peet and Watts 
(1996) sees political ecology as essentially concerned 
with the study of the interconnections and interrelations 
between the economic, political, cultural and religious 
factors in the context of the environments and its 
influence. This investigates the changing socio-cultural 
influences among the farmers and herdsmen and how they 
contribute to the conflicts. 
Agriculture contributes a significant percentage to 
Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The major 
activities in Nigeria’s agricultural sector are crop and 
livestock production. Livestock production alone 
accounts for about one-third of agriculture’s contribution 
to Nigeria’s GDP (Bello, 2013). In addition to its 
nutritional value, the herdsmen, responsible for breeding 
cattle account for substantial sources of animal proteins 
consumed by Nigerians (Ibid). Cattle herding has almost 
become sy00nonymous with the Fulani, Fulbe the Shuwa, 
the Koyam, the Badawi, the Buduma and the Dark Buzzu 
tribes spread across several West African countries. The 
most popular with this trade are the Fulanis. The crop 
production aspect of Nigerian agriculture is dominated 
by rural-based small-scale arable crop producers, who 
account for about 80% of total food supplies (Fayinka, 
2004). Crop production in Nigeria is carried out mostly in 
the rural areas. 
The political ecology of the Farmers/Herdsmen 
conflicts in Nigeria can be properly seen when properly 
used in the context of the scarcity and the right to own 
resources. In this regard, we can use the competition for 
scarce resources (land) between the two groups desperate 
to protect their traditional means of livelihood and culture 
in the ever-shrinking ecosystem made aggravated by 
the availability of declining resources, overcrowding, 
incursion into each other’s traditional lines and spaces, 
and rising tensions from social interactions (Bello, 2013). 
In the case of Nigeria, which is the case focus of this 
paper, the situation seems to have been aggravated by the 
devastating effects of migration-induced climate change 
to the North-Central region led herdsmen to travel farther 
in search of pasture for their livestock. This region, 
unfortunately, has suddenly become a hotbed for the 
violent conflicts between the two groups in recent times.  
The nomads or pastoralist sees herding as an essential 
part of their culture. In the context of the farmers/
herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria, the average Fulani 
herdsman sees his herd of cattle as his reference not 
only to his means of subsistence, but also his cultural 
heritage as handed down from his ancestors. In effect, he 
immediately sees any threat to his herd as an attack on 
his identity, heritage, and means of survival which must 
be protected, if possible, with his life. It was in other to 
protect the Fulani cattle heritage that led to the formation 
of Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria 
(MACBAN) to prevent their culture from extinction 
through advocacy for cultural and political integration of 
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the traditional herders anywhere they settle (Awogbade, 
1987).
Because the state has often been seen as an unfair 
arbitrator in resolving conflicts between the herdsmen 
and farmers using policies like heavy taxation, expulsion, 
and in some cases, indiscriminate arrests of members of 
one group in the favour of the other; one of the parties 
have increasingly resorted to the use of violence partly 
driven by the “do-or-die” mode for survival in a hostile 
and competitive environment of scarce and leaner 
resources. As Okoli and Atelhe (2014, p.80) have noted 
in their field study of Nassarawa state that “the attempt 
by the settled native farmers to displace, disinherit, 
victimize, or marginalize the herdsmen in their common 
ecological domain has been adjudged by the latter as an 
invitation to war. The inevitable outcome of this pattern 
of inter-group relations in the state has been a vicious 
circle of eco-violence and vendetta.”
While the two groups have maintained cooperative 
relations in time past, the increased human population has 
had its toll on arable land for farming. Nonetheless, the 
persistence of slash and burn agriculture typical of much 
of semi-arid and sub-humid West Africa has allowed the 
two groups to co-exist, especially through the exchange 
of crop residues for manure.
However, in recent times, pressure on land has 
constantly brought the herdsmen and the arable farmers 
into violent conflict, which has claimed many lives and 
properties. In North-Eastern Nigerian state of Adamawa 
28 people were reported dead and over 2000 farmers 
displaced in farmers/herdsmen conflicts in 2005 (Nweze, 
2005). 
Integrated Regional Information Network (2009) 
observed that part of the reasons for the increased 
conflicts between the two groups is as a result of 
desertification which poses serious constraints for both 
farmers and herdsmen. In addition, of Nigeria’s over 
400 grazing reserves, less than one-third are presently 
officially in use as a result of conversions of their 
usage to farmlands or housing facilities to cater for the 
increased human population as a fallout of the pressures 
of urbanisation. In his study, Adisa (2012) notes that 
conflicts arising from such leads to inequitable access 
to land, diminishing land resources, antagonistic values 
among land users, land use policy contradictions, and 
non-recognition of rights of indigenous people own the 
resource and nebulous provisions of the Land Use Act 
(1978) to adequately cater for the rights of settlers/non-
indigenes to own land for commercial and agricultural 
purposes. As Okoli and Atelhe (2014, p.81) posit, “When 
the people’s sources of livelihood are threatened as a 
consequence of the ecological vicissitudes and vagaries 
associated with climate change, desperate tactics are 
employed to ensure survival.” 
Estimates by the International Centre for Investigative 
Reporting records that communal violence, mostly 
involving contests for resources, killed at least 10,000 
Nigerians in less than a decade and this is strongly linked 
to climate change (Ojetunde 2017). Ojetunde (2017) notes 
that desertification-induced migration is another factor 
forcing herdsmen in Nigeria to migrate southwards. This 
has made herdsmen who used to depend on the green 
pasture they had in past had to start moving down to the 
Middle Belt areas thereby increasing the pressure on land. 
Also, the International Crisis Group (2017) noted that the 
key causative factors behind this escalating conflict are 
“climatic changes (frequent droughts and desertification); 
population growth (loss of northern grazing lands to 
the expansion of human settlements); technological and 
economic changes (new livestock and farming practices); 
crime (rural banditry and cattle rustling); political and 
ethnic strife (intensified by the spread of illicit firearms); 
and cultural changes (the collapse of traditional conflict 
management mechanisms)”
In the past five years, International Crisis Group 
(2017) reports “annual average of more than 2,000 [lives] 
from 2011 to 2016, for some years exceeding the toll 
from the Boko Haram insurgency. Tens of thousands 
have been forcibly displaced, with properties, crops and 
livestock worth billions of naira destroyed, at great cost 
to local and state economies.”
Though the problem is largely an environmental or 
ecological issue, vested interests in the conflicts seem to 
be deriving some benefits as a means of consolidating 
power and economic resources.  This makes the 
conflict have implications of serious national security 
proportions. While other factors highlighted above have 
been well researched by scholars, this new dimension for 
the changing patterns of the conflicts is of interests to this 
paper.
METHODOLOGY
The author relied largely on data for this study from 
the Nigeria Watch database accessed from its website1. 
The Nigeria Watch database is a research project that 
monitors lethal violence, conflicts, and human security 
in Nigeria. The project originally began in 2006 in Paris 
but moved to the French Institute for Research in Africa 
(IFRA-Nigeria) in 2013, which is located at Nigeria’s 
premier University of Ibadan. The Nigeria Watch aims 
to2:
“compile and monitor homicides and violent deaths 
(including accidents) in Nigeria in order to provide 
statistics, analyse trends and draw maps that can help 
to localise dangerous spots and secure transport of 
passengers and goods. The data relies on a thorough 
reading of the Nigerian press (15 dailies & weeklies) 
1  www.nigeriawatch.org
2  Nigeria Watch database mission statement on http://www.
nigeriawatch.org/index.php?html=3 
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and reports from human rights organisations. The two 
main objectives of the database are 1) to set up a GIS 
(Geographic Information System) to localise dangerous 
spots; 2) assess the rise, decline or stabilisation of 
violence in Nigeria (all things being equal).”
The author also relied on media reports on the farmers/
herdsmen conflicts especially the period not covered by 
the database. The database does not yet have record (as 
of the time of this writing) of 2018 conflicts. The author, 
therefore, compiled media reports from January to April, 
2018 to complement Nigeria Watch database.
A study of this nature depends on the credibility 
of the data. The author, therefore, chooses Nigeria 
Watch database because it has proven to be a reliable 
source(s) of data since its commencement in 2006. It 
also has a history of non-partisanship and credibility 
which are two essential requirements for a study of this 
nature. The database also depends on several sources to 
generate the data in addition to its field staff. The coding 
scheme adopted by Nigeria Watch firmly tallies with 
the objectives of this study. Also, the database leaves no 
room for the user to choose which data to use or not use 
under each coding classification.
INSECURITY, KILLINGS, AND THE PATTERNS 
OF FARMERS/HERDSMEN CONFLICTS: 
ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND PATTERNS 
ACROSS NIGERIA (AUGUST 2014-APRIL 2018)
During the past four years, the Nigeria Watch database 
has recorded 1067 violent deaths related to cattle grazing 
(1.7%), out of a total of 62,278 violent fatalities in 
Nigeria. The relatively small number of deaths recorded 
for this by the Nigeria Watch database may be due to the 
ethnic and religious categorisation of the conflicts by the 
media which may have led the coders at the database to 
record several deaths as having either ethnic, religious or 
political causes. For instance, the tag “Fulani herdsmen” 
may fall easily under ethnic conflict rather than just land 
issues or just livestock rearing.
The analysis that follows was undertaken with several 
reported cases in the media across Nigeria’s 36 states 
from August 2014 to December 2017. The database seeks 
to understand the frequency, intensity, trends, location, 
and patterns of the violence based on several incidents in 
the years under review. The author supplements Nigeria 
Watch database with content analysis of media reports 
from January to April 2018 since Nigeria Watch is yet to 
come up with data for 2018. 
Source: Nigeria Watch database, 2017.
Figure 1
Major Trends of Violence 2006-2017
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According to the Nigeria Watch database, there has 
been a reduction in the numbers of recorded fatalities 
in Nigeria since 2014, as indicated in Figure 1 above. A 
decline of about 56% in lethal violence witnessed in this 
period can be attributed to the renewed fight against Boko 
Haram insurgents (which accounts for about half of lethal 
violence in 2014) that saw the group’s gradual retreat 
to neighbouring countries. In 2015 alone, the insurgents 
account for 9264 out of a total of 17024 (Nigeria Watch, 
2016, p.9). On the other hand, cases of cattle grazing appear 
to be on the rise since 2014. As shown in Table 1 below, the 
deaths arising from cattle grazing recorded 386 deaths in 
2017 as against 114 in 2015 which is about 239% increase.
Table 1
 Violent Deaths in Nigeria Caused by Cattle Grazing 
(August 2014–December 2017)
Year Number of Deaths
2014 79
2015 114
2016 168
2017 386
Total 747
Source: Nigeria Watch database
In 2017, conflicts between farmers and herdsmen in 
search of grazing and water for their cattle took place in 
20 states of the federation including the retaliatory attacks 
on the Fulani community in Mambilla Plateau, Taraba 
state. The frequency of the conflicts led states like Ekiti 
and Benue to pass anti-grazing laws as a means to cope 
with the problem.
Table 2
Recent Farmer/Herdsmen Clashes in Nigeria (January- 
April, 2018)
Date Place of Incident(s)
Number 
of 
Deaths
05-Jan-18 Akor village of Guma Local Government Area of Benue State. 19
23-Jan-18 Numan district of Adamawa state 6
05-Feb-18 Guma Local Government Area, Benue state 6
08-Feb-18 Saki, Oyo state 1
12-Feb-18 Korakga Uvir in Guma local government area of Benue state. 2
12-Feb-18 Zangwra community, Miango District, Irigwe Chiefdom, Plateau State 3
12-Feb-18 Azege village, Ayilamo in Logo local government area, Benue state 1
13-Feb-18 Itigi, Cross River state 1
05-Mar-18 Umenge village in Guma Local Government Area of Benue State 5
07-Mar-18
Omusu village, at Ojigo Ward, Edumoga 
in Okpokwu Local Government Area of 
Benue state
26
17-Mar-18
Ugboha, Esan South East Local and 
Odiguete Ovia North East Local 
Government Areas of Edo state
5
Date Place of Incident(s)
Number 
of 
Deaths
11-Mar-18 Bakos, Plateu state 16
15-Mar-18 Rafiki area of Plateau State 2
19-Mar-18 Omala Local Government Area of Kogi state 10
30-Mar-18 Bakin Kogi, Kaninkon chiefdom in Jama’a Local Government Area of Kaduna State 6
06-Apr-18 Agagbe area of Gwer West local government area of Benue State 10
08-Apr-18 Benin City, Edo state 2
10-Apr-18 Oyi, Anambra state 1
11-Apr-18 Logo and Ukum local government areas of Benue state 15
13-Apr-18 Taraba, Zamfara, Benue 66
17-Apr-18 Benue and Nasarawa states 36
17-Apr-18
Ukemberagya/Tswarev ward of Gaambe-
Tiev, Logo local government area of Benue 
state
1
22-Apr-18 Logo local government of Benue State 1
21-Apr-18 Aniocha North Local Government Area, Delta State. 1
20-Apr-18 Suntai Local Government Area of Taraba State 4
23-Apr-18 Logo local government area of Benue state 1
25-Apr-18 Gwer East Local Government Area of Benue State 19
25-Apr-18 Guma local government area, Benue state 39
26-Apr-18 Logo local government area of Benue state 7
30-Apr-18 Gwer West Local Government Area of Benue state 8
Total 3201
Source: Author’s compilations of reports on The Vanguard between 
January to April, 2018.
As shown in Table 2 above, there was a record of 
320 deaths arising from farmers and herdsmen conflicts 
between January to April 2018. This period witnessed 
some of the most horrific attacks reported by the media 
including the killing of 2 clergymen and 17 parishioners 
at St. Ignatius Catholic Church in Ukpor -Mbalom 
community in Gwer East Local Government of Benue 
State3. In January 2018, Mobgal Hore Fulbe, the umbrella 
body group of Fulani herdsmen in Adamawa state raised 
the alarm about silent killings of herdsmen and rustling of 
cattle in Numan and Demsa Local Government areas of 
the state. The author could not verify this claim as such 
are hardly reported in the media.
3  Fresh bloodbath in Benue, 2 Catholic priests, 17 others 
killed by herdsmen (2018, April 25) The Vanguard Accessed 
on https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/04/fresh-bloodbath-
benue-2-catholic-priests-17-others-killed-herdsmen/
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LAND DISPUTES AND PATTERNS OF 
FARMERS/HERDSMEN CONFLICTS: A 
GEO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS (AUGUST 
2014-APRIL 2018)
Conflicts over land ownership in Nigeria is extremely 
complex. It often has political, economic, religious, and 
cultural undertones. Partly accounting for this complexity 
is that access to land is believed to play important 
economic roles (Conroy, 2014) just as it is an important 
symbol of social status in Africa (Dafinger and Pelican, 
2006). Land conflicts are also some of the most difficult 
to report in the media.
Nigeria Watch database shows that land conflicts 
account for 1367 of the violent deaths from August 2014 
to April 2018 according to Table 3 below; while farmers/
herdsmen conflicts accounts for 1067 during the period. 
This shows the important connection between access to 
land and the farmers/herdsmen conflicts.
According to the database (cited in Ichite 2015), 68% 
of deaths occurred in the northern part of Nigeria. The 
North-Central or Middle Belt (especially Benue, Plateau, 
and Nassarawa) accounting for the largest reported cases 
of deaths arising from land disputes. Media reports of 
the clashes between the farmers and herdsmen between 
January and April 2018 have largely been in Benue with 
Local Government Areas (LGA) like Guma, Logo, and 
Makurdi being the worst hit. 
Table 3
Violent Deaths in Nigeria Caused by Land Disputes 
(August 2014–April 2018)
Year Number of deaths
2014 41
2015 111
2016 200
2017 1015
2018 NA2
Total 1367
Source: Nigeria Watch database.
In 2016, communal conflicts accounted for a large 
chunk of deaths from approximately 65 incidents recorded 
across the country according to Nigeria Watch (2017, 
p.17). The cause of violence in the communities was 
primarily land dispute. States like Delta, Cross River, 
Kogi, and Akwa Ibom recorded high number of fatal 
community conflicts. The heaviest incidences were 
prevalent in the Middle-Belt states. Gassol LGA in Taraba 
state, North-Central Nigeria recorded 22 people losing 
their lives to land-related conflicts. Cross River and Delta, 
according to the report, lost 60 and 31 people respectively 
to land-related conflicts. Figure 2 below depicts the 
situation.
Source: Nigeria Watch, 2017.
Figure 2
Map of Fatalities Related to Communal Violence per State in 2016
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IDENTITY POLITICS, LAND DISPUTES, 
AND THE PATTERNS OF FARMERS/
HERDSMEN CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA
This section takes a critical look at the connections 
between access to land disputes, identity politics and the 
new patterns of the conflicts. While we do not completely 
agree with Baidoo (2014) and Ahmed-Gamgum (2018) 
that the insecurity arising from the farmers/herdsmen 
conflicts were primarily motivated by the need to derive 
“political capital” by some political actors in the conflicts, 
a careful analysis of the recent events since January 
2018 seem to confirm the role of vested interests in the 
conflicts. Unlike Baidoo (2014) and Ahmed-Gamgum 
(2018), these vested interests may not always be about 
gaining political capital out of the conflicts. 
Between January to April, 2018 there has been 
increased media reports of continued clashes between both 
parties. The implications of these conflicts are that Nigeria 
loses in addition of loss of lives and properties, the country 
loses $13.7 billion annually4. Olayoku (2016, p.74) argues 
that “political authorities, and local or foreign ‘mercenaries’ 
also played a role” in escalating the conflicts.
With land being a symbol of social and economic 
status among farming communities, herdsmen face 
continued threats to their livestock, an essential symbol 
of their heritage, especially in areas where land disputes 
are severe. With land fixed in supply and in many cases 
declining due to the effects of desertification, erosion, 
drought, and climate change, life appears to be getting 
more difficult and strenuous in the face of scarcity of 
grazing land for both the farmers and herdsmen. These 
almost automatically mean the degradation of grazing 
routes, farm encroachments, the further breakdown of 
traditional means of resolving farmers/herdsmen conflicts, 
and weakening of policy frameworks to protect grazing 
routes.
The connection(s) between climate change and 
conflicts is still being debated among scholars, even 
though it can take a very long time to see such connection 
(if such exists). The struggle for land between farmers 
and herdsmen appear to be getting fiercer by the day. 
Both communities see land as their means of livelihood. 
With the limited access to land in addition to resource-
scarcity, the possibility of violent conflicts between both 
parties is always on the high side. The resulting conflicts 
between both parties have serious implications on food 
security, development policies, national security, the 
environment, and agriculture as an important sector of the 
economy needless to mention the wanton loss of lives and 
properties that have always accompanied the conflicts.
4  Nigeria loses $13.7bn annually to farmers, herdsmen conflicts, 
says Abdulsalami (2017, October 30) The Vanguard Accessed 
on https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/nigeria-loses-13-7bn-
annually-farmers-herdsmen-conflicts-says-abdulsalami/
The current research on the farmers/herdsmen 
conflicts points to climate change as an important 
factor in exacerbating the already depleting resources 
(Conroy, 2014, p.7) arising from the competition over the 
availability of fertile land for crop production for farmers 
and grazing for herders. Buttressing further the impact 
of climate change-induced Southwards migration of the 
herdsmen, one official in Tureta Local Council in Sokoto 
State narrates as follows:
“In the past, the migration use to be more in the middle of the 
dry season and after harvest but nowadays it is throughout the 
year. Worst of all during planting season, they (Fulani herdsmen) 
walk on seeds planted, and in most cases a lot of the seeds fail 
to germinate. This has caused huge loss to us. The damage is 
usually the cause of our conflicts with the Fulani herdsmen. It is 
a yearly battle between us.” (Odoh and Chidozie 2012, p.120)
 Odoh and Chidozie (2012, p.118) further posit that 
in Nigeria, “… communal clashes (often mis-interpreted 
or mis-represented as ethnic and religious clashes) are 
actually struggle over either the control of land or mineral 
resources or both.” They further argue that climate-
induced migration caused by the “cereal-productive 
Sudan savannah ecology is transiting to pure Sahel and 
the influence of the Sahara is increasing southwards” 
gives better account of the increasing frequencies of these 
conflicts in Nigeria.
Several studies found out that most Nigerians, about 
60%, do not know or deny the reality of the concept of, 
causes and effects of climate change on their environment 
(Odjugo, 2013; Nzeadibe, Egbule, Chukwuone, Agu, 
2011; IRIN, 2017). Though the Federal Government is 
fully aware of the problem and has responded by creating 
a Department of Climate Change in the Ministry of 
Environment in 2011 as part of “measures necessary to 
reduce vulnerability to climate change.”5
Even though existing studies focus largely on the 
possibilities of climate change-induced conflicts from 
farmers/herdsmen, climate change-induced migration 
portends a greater danger. Recently, the World Bank 
has raised an alarm that over 140 million people could 
be forced to leave their countries by 2050 due to the 
worsening impacts of climate change thereby creating 
a looming humanitarian crisis and threatening the 
development process (Odunsi 2018). Ever since the 
Land Use Act of 1978 was passed by Major-General 
Obasanjo (the head of state during military rule), the sub-
surface mineral rights belong to the state and managed 
by local political elites, and not the people (Ibeanu 2000 
cited in Conroy 2014). The Act vested the powers to 
discretionarily allocate land to ruling elites in conjunction 
with powerful/manorial-like traditional/customary chiefs 
to determine who gets what and how as far as access 
5  Department of Climate Change (2018) Department of Climate 
Change, Federal Ministry of Environment, Abuja Available on 
climatechange.gov.ng/about-us/department-of-climate-change/
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to land is concerned within the communities. The new 
land-use administration originally intended to boost 
agriculture have had unintended consequences especially 
in the area of environmental degradation for failing 
to anticipate climate change. With the Land Use Act 
outliving its usefulness, there have been stringent calls for 
its amendments or outright abrogation since it has made 
access to land especially for settlers/non-indigenes to do 
business and other economic activities rather difficult. The 
powerful vested interests and the manorial-like traditional 
chiefs in addition to its inclusion in the 1999 Constitution 
have all made it difficult to amend despite the fact 
that current realities urgently demands its amendment. 
Unfortunately, the question of land was central during the 
debate as to whether to adopt cattle ranching as a solution 
to end this crisis because there were fears that farmers (who 
are often indigenes) may lose more lands to herders (who 
are often either settlers or non-indigenes). The Committee 
for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), in January 
2018, said that the Federal Government’s proposed 
establishment of cattle ranches across the country will 
not bring lasting solution to herdsmen/farmers clashes 
because “over 370,000 hectares of Nigeria’s land will 
be given to herdsmen”6. This was at the same period 
that Delta state Governor Ifeanyi Okowa even though 
his state was under siege by herdsmen he “will not cede 
land” to the herders for ranching as “definite policy to end 
herdsmen’s attacks”7. The Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) 
also rejected the idea of ranching or “cattle colonies” 
saying it will not allow it in the South-West8.
As a response to their dissatisfaction with grazing 
and the fear of losing their lands, several governors went 
ahead to ban open grazing with strict enforcement in their 
states without providing alternatives to the herders making 
them threaten to resort to self-defence for the protection 
of their means of livelihoods thereby raising concerns that 
the army may be conniving with the herdsmen defying the 
Open Grazing Prohibition Law in Benue state to carry out 
their threats of violence as alleged by Independent Human 
Rights and Crime Monitoring Group (IHRCMG)9.
Identity politics is an integral part of Nigerian 
political life. The Nigerian political elites have always 
6  Cattle colonies: 370,000 hectares of Nigeria’s land’ll be given 
to herdsmen for personal business – CSO (2018, January 23) The 
Vanguard Accessed on https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/
cattle-colonies-370000-hectares-nigerias-landll-given-herdsmen-
personal-business-cso/
7  Delta under herdsmen’s siege — Okowa (2018, March 8) The 
Vanguard Accessed on https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/delta-
herdsmens-siege-okowa/ 
8  Herdsmen Menace: We won’t allow cattle colonies in S’West — 
YCE (2018, January 19) The Vanguard Accessed on https://www.
vanguardngr.com/2018/01/herdsmen-menace-wont-allow-cattle-
colonies-swest-yce/ 
9  Exercise Ayem A’ Kpatuma encouraging influx of herdsmen into 
Benue — Rights group (2018, March 8) The Vanguard accessed on 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/02/benue-killings-herdsmen-
agree-cease-fire/
sought to reap advantages from the multidimensional, 
especially ethnic and religious identities, more so during 
electioneering periods, and this has resulted in conflicts 
and instability. Due to the multi-ethnic composition of 
Nigeria, some vested interests often try to take advantage 
by seeking electoral and economic gains from the 
conflicts. This is perhaps why Lenshie (2014, p.198) 
argues “Nigeria’s political atmosphere presents an ever 
increasing level of virulent ethno-cultural resurgence of 
identity. The elite’s manipulation of ethnicity and religion 
tends to” escalate challenges like the farmers/herdsmen 
conflicts. Identity politics is not the problem in itself, but 
the use to which these vested interests put these ethnic and 
religious consciousnesses (Paul, Onwuegbuchulam and 
Mtshali, 2017).
The Middle-Belt region of the country, the hotbed of 
the farmers/herdsmen’s conflicts, is the meeting point 
between the North (largely dominated by Muslims) and 
the South (largely dominated by Christians), identity 
politicians have found ways to push the narrative that the 
conflict is between Muslims and Christians.
The absence of vehicles of social control that were 
characteristic of traditional African societies, such as 
kinship, religious and political systems concerned with the 
well-being of the community, has led to the escalation of 
ethno-religious conflicts. 
In the heat of the conflicts, Vice President Professor 
Yemi Osinbajo warned against politicizing farmers/
herdsmen crisis the country saying such interpretation 
could inflame passion from certain quarters thus cause 
an unpredicted crisis in the country (Agbakwuru & 
Erunke, 2018). Also, in a direct response to one-time 
Minister of Defence and Chief of Army Staff, Lt. 
Gen. Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma (rtd), the Buhari 
administration cautioned leaders in the country against 
making inflammatory statements that could threaten the 
country’s unity. Lt. Gen. Danjuma has earlier made a 
statement alleging that the military was on the side of the 
terrorist group to wipe out some of the minority groups 
in the country and advised citizens to defend themselves 
(Agbakwuru, 2018). Gen Danjuma(Rtd.)’s statement 
immediately attracted the attention of several groups 
including the tribal leaders of Benue state under the aegis 
of the Mdzough U Tiv, the ldoma National Forum and 
Omi Ny’lgede who declared their support and calling on 
indigenes to take up arms against herdsmen10.
Despite these warnings, many people, especially on 
social media went on with the narrative of “Muslim killing 
Christians” or “Fulanis herdsmen killing” a development 
which soon attracted organisations from both religions 
10  Benue tribal leaders back Danjuma, accuse FG, military of 
aiding takeover of Benue by herdsmen (2018, March 27) The 
Vanguard Accessed on https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/
benue-tribal-leaders-back-danjuma-accuse-fg-military-of-aiding-
takeover-of-benue-by-herdsmen/ 
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and ethnic groups. Strictly speaking, several reports 
show how the Media unnecessarily tagged the suspected 
herdsmen “Fulani” with neither proper investigation nor 
revelation of the names of the perpetrators. A check on 
the key phrase “Fulani Herdsmen” on Vanguard online 
website revealed during the period under from January-
April, 2018 more than 80% of the stories that were 
reported between farmers and herders clashes, described 
the herdsmen as “Fulani herdsmen”. According to The 
Vanguard, “…what is primarily a battle for land and water 
fuelled by climate change and rapid population growth 
has been seized upon by identity politicians and religious 
leaders”11. This came with serious ethnic and religious 
profiling especially tagging all herdsmen as “Fulani” 
and Muslims even without proper investigations of their 
names or background.
On 29 April 2018, the Middle Belt Conscience Guard 
monitoring the Herdsmen/Farmers Crisis in Nigeria 
alleged that members of the National Assembly are out to 
scale up public anger against the President and his security 
team over the activities of terrorists in the country. The 
group saw the invitation of the President by the National 
Assembly is “sham with hidden objectives”12. This was 
at the same period when the Christian Council of Nigeria 
(CCN) accused the Federal Government of trivialising and 
playing down the violent activities of killer-herdsmen in 
Nigeria, by describing it as “conflicts between herdsmen 
and farmers.” (Nwaiwu, 2018). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study has situated and analysed the relationship 
between climate change, land disputes, and the patterns 
of farmers and herdsmen conflicts in Nigeria. Using data 
from the Nigeria Watch database from August 2014 to 
April 2018, it has identified the major stakeholders as 
being basically communities of farmers and herdsmen.
In this study, we found out the following: first, 
the farmers/herdsmen conflicts appear to be more 
prevalent in the Middle-Belt (North) and other minority-
dominated areas of the South. We observed that several 
human factors, such as the increased population density, 
economic and social status attached to land, Boko 
Haram insurgency, etc and environmental issues such as 
increasing desertification, encroachment on grazing routes 
as an effect of increase in human population, decreased 
productivity of farmlands as an effect of draughts. While 
land disputes might have been involving multinational 
corporations exist in minority areas in the South, access to 
11  Nigerian media under scrutiny over herder-farmer conflict (2018, 
April 17) The Vanguard Accessed on https://www.vanguardngr.
com/2018/04/nigerian-media-scrutiny-herder-farmer-conflict/ 
12  NASS out to demonize PMB, security team over herdsmen/
farmers crisis (2018, April 29) The Vanguard Accessed on https://
www.vanguardngr.com/2018/04/nass-out-to-demonize-pmb-
security-team-over-herdsmen-farmers-crisis/
land-related disputes is nationwide with the north adding 
socio-economic and political shortcomings that make 
land conflict more likely, especially where the livelihoods 
of most people in that are primarily agrarian which see 
farmers and herdsmen compete fiercely for over land and 
its resources. Nigeria Watch database shows that there 
was an increase in deaths arising from land disputes and 
farmers/herdsmen’s conflicts between 2014 and 2018 
which provides the necessary correlations between them.
Second, the study finds a weak correlation between 
climate change and the farmers/herdsmen conflicts largely 
due to its reliance on limited data. Like many studies, 
the data is inconclusive. This study, therefore, agrees 
with Cattaneo and Massetti (2015 :17) that, even though 
there are manifests damages caused by climate change, 
data on its impacts as a causative factor in the patterns of 
the conflicts have not been “statistically significant” to 
make such connection(s). However, the study finds some 
connections between the frequencies of land disputes in 
the Middle-Belt (North-Central) and the farmers/herdsmen 
conflicts in the region may be attributed to desertification, 
land scarcity, climate-induced migration etc which are 
all effects of climate change. This may have created the 
scarcity (caused by the continuous shrinking of land 
resources) attributed to the increasing conflicts between 
both communities in recent times. the compression of 
land space which brings both communities unusually 
close also can be an indicator of the increased conflicts 
between both communities. The fact that most Nigerians 
are not even aware of the effect(s) of climate change on 
their environment may also be a factor in why it is hardly 
reported in the media because it is difficult to connect 
climate change to the farmers/herdsmen’s conflicts. 
This partly explains why most reports on the conflicts 
have been given either ethnic or religious causation, as 
promoted by identity politicians and other vested interests 
even though the recent arrests of some of the perpetrators 
do not necessarily portray these narratives as it is often 
widely reported in the media. It may be difficult at present 
to connect climate change to the farmers and herdsmen 
conflicts, but this researcher is confident future research 
will firmly establish these connections.
The question of the contentious access to land and 
land tenure issues remain central to exacerbating these 
conflicts. While vested interests may have genuine fears 
about losing their lands, this study finds that denying 
other Nigerians (non-indigenes/settlers) access to land 
for economic purposes under the guise of being “non-
indigenes” or “settlers” may account for the growing 
intensity of the conflicts especially with several states 
banning open grazing while at the same time making 
access to land needlessly difficult. This study further finds 
the Land Use Act (1978) to have outlived its usefulness 
as it has failed to fairly allocate land to those who may 
legitimately need it as it gives government the power to 
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allocate land while at the same time gave local feudal 
lords the power to allocate what it calls “customary land”. 
This is allowed vested interests deny Nigerians who are 
not indigenes the right to have access to land. This is the 
case with the Middle-Belt in the North (the region with 
the most reported cases of land disputes) and minority 
areas in the South. It is, therefore, not surprising that these 
areas are some of the worst hit in the recent patterns of 
farmers and herdsmen conflicts. Also, the role of vested 
interests come to play in this case because, in the case of 
farmers/herdsmen conflicts, many see it as a means of 
electoral, economic, and other pecuniary gains thereby 
escalating the conflicts.
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